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This note eviews the !ncst popular rnathematca primitives that are used in cnrene
attempts to build secure uetwo±s.
1 Introduction
Corporations wor:dwide eniy regard the Imerriet, once the ainiost exclusive p1av.ound uf the
global community of aputer nerds, as an immense business opportunity. TJntilrece.ntly phrases such as
“consult our homepage at bttp: / /w. dficr±ne - cent” made seicie to orjv a few now they
belong to our everyday vocabulary. This is all part of the explosive owtb of what ha been called the
Global Ira.fcn-rraticrt [rtfra.srrsctco-e. It it a develcpu:eat that cannot be stopped and probably should be
welcomed.
Nevertheless, corporations are beginning tc see that venturing out on the Iri.terriet may expose them
to enornious risks. The purpose of “putting your bomepage on rae web’ is to increase visibility and to
draw attention. Unior-ttmately the audience includes not only potential customers but also virtually
all bathers worldwide. At least seine ofthem will, intentionally Or no-c. cause trouble.
Solutions to the resulting security problems are not hard to find on the net, since many software
vendors now advertise “secure” versions of their prod’ icts. This makes using the net really risky, because
urers might mistakenly belies edhey are well protected. The widely pubinhized and rather frequent news
stories about network hr ak—ins and imperfeetisris in securty software should dispel such illusions. It
seems that our competence to secure the act cannot keep u.p with our desire to use it.
Despite the confosing array or securty sohitions. there are only a few mathematical p r.ltivcs on
which they are based. Even in faulty security products, thc soundness ofthe underlying mathematics is
hardly ever in questioiu it is the way it is used that causes the walnerab’lities In this note I discuss the
ni.thematicai pnmitives—not the many slippery ways in. which they are emolo3 ad. I c cenucate on ihe
primitives themselves and the assumption. of their soundness and will show that this is one of the most
important tea-sons that compzrtatiorwJ nz.onher theori, has become so fashionable, even at industrial
labs. This pcpulsrny. based entirely on our incompetence at efficiently salving a few basic number
theoretic problems. is hardly something of whiclito be proud. Purists who cbect to the vingarisszion of
number theory should End comfort in the prospect that as soon as efficient solutions have been found,
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number theory will again be the imaDisteL impractica Queen of Mathematics—its status before
“sccuxftv tons” came along
This note is w-ritzeo. for an undeçradua:e mathematics audience that is not farniliax with the
thematical notions involved in ninny popular security products. In Section 2 1 sketch a. possible
secu±y application on the Internet, Of course. much more is involved in practice than I am able to
mentionhere, but I show some of the basic concepts and set the stage for the mathematical priwitiv
that are presented it: Sections 3 and 4 l”c attempts are made to formalize notions such as “infe.asiMe”,
“hard” or “efficient ‘.For further background reler to [2] (Saction2) and [1] (Sections 3 and 4).
2 Background
The following naive scenario, though grossly oversimplified, shows some of the key issues of
COflhiril]fliCat!Ofl seounty. Suppose that two parties who have never’ met want to exchange confidentIal
information over some untrusted but reliable network. “Untrusted” here means that all messages are
accessible to eve,droppers: “reliable” means that no bits are dropped or changed. The Internet is a
reasonable example of such a network.
If the two parties share a random string s of secret bits that is as long a.s the messagem, then the
problem can easily be solved: send the birise erthLslee or s e rn of sand rn. Sinces is random, s m
leaks no information. Furthermore, itis easyto derive rn from a mbecause m=se (s m). This
would solve the problem, except that we cannot assume that any t-wo parties liaye a secret string of
random hiss in common. A further disadvantage is that, using this simple approach, each scan be used
only once (since s e rn1 and s e rn, reveal information about ra1 rn= (,s in1) e (s m2)).
The latter problem can be overcome by using, for instance, DES—the U.S. governmentis Data
Encryption Standard. DES is an example of a block cs,.har. It can be used to construct a functionf such
that it is su.ciently hard to derive m from f(s, rn) (for any number of messages in of any length). such
that in fçs, f(s, rn)). and such than f can very efflcientiy be computed. Here s is a 56—bit string, or a
l6—bit string if higher security is needed (triple—DES); this string is referred to as the kej Thus. if
both parties had a common key s tha.t was unknown to any other party, any message m could be
encrvted as f(s. in), sent to the other party using an untrusted channel, and decrypted
as m.=f(s. f(s,m)) .This can be repeated bank arid forth, for any reasonable number of messages.
A d€scriution aiDES is beyond the scope of this note; it does alot of seeming y arbitrary bit —fiddling
that aims to, among other things, corzfiso arid dzffasa the hits of the keys and the messagem.. There
are many other ciphers that cat be used tu construct functions that have properties similar to f. For
our purposes the problem that remains to be considered is how the two pArties perform the key
ezchamge for a. relatively short key (of, say, 56 bits) in such a way that the key that is exchanged remains
hidden to an eavesdropper.
Note that the simple approach where the (trusted) provider of the communication services assigns a
uinque random key to each nair of taible parties is not feasible: each party wo-ild necd an enormous data
base ofkeys. which would not only heharci to keep updated (for new subscribers) but would also have tobe
safeguarded very carefully. An elegant solution to rue problem of key exchange is given in Section 4. It
only requius a small amount of public information that is accessible to the entire network. While using it.
howe’er all parties involved need to sign all their messages..
This requires digital signatures to convince each of the communicating parb that the messages
they receive cerne fr3m the party they intend to coumuuicate with, This can be realized using public
key c qraph. as e Inrad in the next sectiont. In public key cptograpbv aJ.1 parties have a secret
key and a corresponding pvblzc key. In signature applications the secret key is used by tie owner to
generate a signature; the corresponding public key cnn be used by anyone to check the validity of the
signature.
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Thus. all secret keys arekept hidden by their owuer, but all parties have acccss to each other pub]i
keys, just as :eleprione cumners are ,mosdy) public inforniation. Alternatively. parties that wish to
communicate can exchange their public keys first; this in turn leads to the problem of authenticating
public keys and related issues. which cart Sc eli be solved using public key c.ryptoaphv (and which may.
in cp.rcnin circinna±a:ees reculre a trusted third party). In practice many other problems have to be
addressed as well. The purpose ofour simpleminded example is crllyto introduce the basic principles as a
background for the mathematical primitives that ore presented below.
A crvptogra.phic technique that is often used fot digital signatures in conjunctIon with public key
yptography is hashing. A bash function. h. when applied to a message rn of arbitrary length, results in
a fixed length hash h (m) of rn; for M05 (‘Message Digest’) therestilting length is l28bits. for SEtS (the
U.S. governmentis ‘Secure Hash Standard’) it islGO bits. For a good hash function it should beinfeesible
to compute anrn such that h(rr,) is eaual to any prescribed value. Aisc, it should be infeasible to find
different m1 andm2such that h (m1)h (m Like DES, the currently popular hash functions are
based on very ecient seemingly random bit manipulations, nd not on clear—cut mathematical ideas as
most public key yptosystems are (even though those ideas might turn out to be incorrect). It is an open
problem how to desigtra very efficient hashfunction that is provably as hard to break as one ofth public
key ciptosys-tetns described below. It is also becoming an urgent problem: on May 2, 1996. Hans
Dobbertin ofthe German Information Security Agency, who was responsible for breaking 2’1D4 in 1995,
announced a new cryptanslysis of MDS that ‘might be reason enough to substitute MOS in future
applications’. The life ncpectancy ofSEtS is uncertain, since its design is very similar to that of MT)5.
3 Factormg
..omposite integer n means finding integers p and q both> 1 sum that np q This is
baits generality, believed to be a hard problem, even though there is no firm mathematical gound on which
this assumption can be based: the only evidstne is our failure to End an ecient factoring method:
The supposed difftcuity of factoringis crucial for the security of the RSA public key ryptosystern,
which was invented in 197T by Rive.st, Shami’, and Adleman. Each user of RSA has its own modulus
nrrp.g. where ii and q are two large primes, and two integers e and ci such that
imod(p—1)(q— 1) Thevalues nunde aremadepublic asthat user’s publickey, butdiskepc
secret (along with p and q) said is the ur’s secret ke Since large primes can efficiently be generated, and
because clean quickly be found using the extended Euclidean algorithm given e, p, and < (for Droperly
chosen e). such n. e. and ci can easily be found for each user of RSA..
To send a message mEZ/nZ to the owner of public key (n, e), one computes E(rn) = m and
transmits the encrypted massage .E(m). The owner of (n, e). upon receipt of E(m), reeves the
unencrypted message rn by computing E(m )d = in (of. Ferraat’s little theorem). Both the encryption
and the decrotion can efficiently be done using the ‘repeated square and ruuitip.y’ method. This is,
however, considerably slower than, for instance DES. RSA can aLso be use’i to sign a message m as
S(r) = ind the validity of the signature cart be checked by verifying that S(rn)e =
It has not been proved that iaco:ingm is neceatyro break RSA (i.e.. to decrypt E(rn’;knn.witg
€
ann £w bir tur oc’ng i±’< urope” dj bLt rt -s CDVtOLS ruEc en There e’csu se cral
varintIoa of RSA that replace the multiplicative group Z/nZ ) by some other group that depends an
a composite incxliilus. arid in which the operzinons are carried out. None of them, however, seems to have
any substaunal advantages over RSA (despite chums to the contrary). and all of them can be brokenby
factorina the modulus.
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Since the invention of RSA considerable progre.s has been made towards more efficient factoring
methods. Trial division anti PoilarcPs rho method (1975) find the srnaIkt x-irue factor p of n-in
exconential time: 0(p) and 0. respectively. Th ciilptic curve method (acm, 1985) can be
expected, on loose heuristic grounds. to take rime (log ± o(1)).j2iog plug log p), for
p —+c:c Notethat this is subexpcneatia1 lop. These are exsmpit of uavwpase factoring methods,
since their run tine depends on the factors to be found. The largest factor found by any of the methods
(ecm) so far hs 47 decimal digits. None of them is a thraat to RSA, if the orimes in the modulus have at
least. say. 75decimeidlgfts
The run time of geirer-aipurvosc factoring methods depends sniely on the size of the number to be
factored, The most important oaes are the Continued Fraction method (CFRAC. 1970) Quadratic
Sieve (QS. 1081). and the NçrFie1d Sieve NFS. 199). Theflrsttwohaveod.risdc expected runtime
exo((1 ± o(i))1log nlog log m) for n —+ cr though QS is in practice muchco be preferred to CFRAC
They share this run time with many other factoring algorithms, among others the worst case
ofeeni. NFS was the first algorithm to substantially improve upon this time, with heuristic expected nn
time exp((c ÷ o(1)) (log n )‘‘3(log log n ) 2) for n—co and csome constant between a i.sa (for ‘nic&
numbers like 22 ± 1) and 1.92 (for general numbers). NFS is currently considered to he more efficient
than QS for numbers that have more than, say, 110 dedmal digits.
Tbe largest number factored with QS, in 1994, is the famous 129—digit SA—challenge’ that
appeared in the August 1977 issue of Scientific American. Rivest estimated, in 1977, that this
factorizatiou would require 40 quadrillion years. With QS it took S months, using the idle cycles of
computers worldwide. The rotainmthie of this fantoringeffort has been estimated as 5000 mips years,
(he., 500C) years on a VAX 780). The inrgest number factored with NE’S. in 1996, is a 130—digit
RSA—modulus, with total run time estim ted as 550 mips years. Using this figure and the asymptotic
run time of NE’S (omitting tiaeo(1) for-convenience), one can get as. impression of the effbrt required to
factor5l2—bit (155—digit) RSA moduli, and conclude that such moduli are on the verge of being
breakable. With a moderate amount of progress iii factoring, 768—bit keys (a size that is becoming
more popular lately) could become vulnerable us well. A polynomial—time factoring algorithm ws.id
most likely render RSA useless.
4 Discrete logarithms
The most common discrete logarithm problem is the following. Given some primep, a generator g
of (Z/pZ ), and yE(Z/pZ ), find z{0,1, ;. . ,p—1} such that ?=li, Like factoring, this is in its
generality believed to be a hard problem, and, again like fictorhig, the only evidence that ftis hard is that
we have not yet been able to solve ft efficiently
The supposed difficulty of discrete logarithms is the basis for the security of the Diffie—Hllzrann key
exchange protocol (1976). A prime p and generator g are publicly known. Party A picks a random
aE{0,1, p—1}, computes gaE(Z/pZ) and sends it to party B. Party B picks a random
&{0;1 ...,p—1} computes ghE(Z/pZ) and sends it to A. Both parties can now compute the
common key g= g E ( Z/pZ )* As mentioned earlier, this key exchange protocol should be used with
care, since otherwise it is susceptible to a man in the middle atck
It us .ot een on .,-eci tim comoutiag niscrcte ‘ogantozis s necessar tn c-teak he Diffle—Eehman
orooco e to ..ompat g g- en p g g andg bir it is obv’om-’, ‘fflciert Many otner pubuc ke
cryptosysterns have becn proposed that can be broken if discrete logarithms canbe computed efficiently.
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lioweven criiike factoring based systems which aze more or less equal y hard to b:eak. ire the situation
is a bit mote complicated.
It does not seem to be possiblero reduce factoring to discrete logarithms, or vice versi Neverdaele,
there is a strong s i’arity- betweeu the solution methods fr the two problems; witha. few exceptions
(such as ecm) the ideas behind niOst factoring algorithms can he used to solve discrete logarithms as
wLi. Examples are linear search for z and Pollard whith End z in time 0(z) and
operations in (Z/pZ ), respectively. The Causshm inmegers method Ends z in time
ep((1
- o(i)) iog plog iogp ), forp— cc, andisbasadonidaas imilartotheauesthatiedtoQS. And
then there is a Number Field Sieve based method that nds tr in time
exp((1.92 + o(l))(log p) V3(iog log p )2/.) for p—*oo. Although a liv& cryptosystem using a
60—digit prime was breiken in 1991, practical experience with discrete logarithm, algorithms is limited;
riliforts are underway to change this situat!on
An important disthiction between the e onential, and subexponential time discrete logarithm
mthc is that in the former the group (Z/pZ) can be replaced by any group, but in the latter,
a±hmetic properties of the set {1,2,. p—l} (which is usedtc represent (Z/pZ )*) arecruciali This
has several interesting consequences, ofwhichr mention a few,
Ifg gererate only a subgroup of order q<p— 1 of (Z/pZ ), andgE <g>, then z casastilibefound
in 0(&:) <0(’4J) operatiun Ia (Z/pZ)’ (using Pollards rho method, or using Shank&
‘baby— ep—gimnt—step method), or in time subexponeatial in p using any of the simbexponentisl
methods. But a method that runs in time subexponential in q is not known. ffg generates the group or
points of some elliptic curve modulo p, then x can again be found in 0(J) operations in the elliptic
curve group. But no method is mown that runs in time subexponential in the order of g or even inp. If,
on the other han± g generates (Fr) or a subgroup thereof, for some fixed integer m> 1, then z can.
be found in time subexponentiad in pa’. The latter is a consequance of the fact that the relevant arithmetic
properties of the set of polvnoinisls muio p of degree <rn is sirni1r to those of the set
This auperen: lack of discrete logarithm algorith that run in nasubcponential ic the order ofa
subgroup or of an entirely different group that cannot be represented in the way the subexponential
aigorithms require. is- exploited in the design ci several public key stems. In 1)55 (the US - govenirnentis
Digital Signature Standard) an. order q subgroup of (Z/pZ is used to improve the speed of the
cryptosystem. whii at the same time reducin the sizo of the resulting signatures, without. hpef4ly,
compromising the security breaidng it requires time either 0( fq) or
exp((L92 — o(1))(log ) l/&’1g log p )‘ ), both ofwhich are supposedly infeasible for the secified
sizes1log2gj=159 and [iog2p5iI (the Russian variant of DSS requires [Iog7q239) Elliptic
curve based cr-w-ptosvstem- achieve the same objectives sirnpiybv choosing p smalL but large enough to
make 0. Vp ) attcclrs kfeasibe,
Since iogq isfi,xed at 159 and the increa_ce ofprocessor speed has not leveled off yet, I: isnrceivable
that a modenite amount of progreaa in exponential tIme discrete logarithm algorithms could ruake DSS
vuineabie within the foreseeable future-. Aiso, sonic specialists find it too early to give up hope for better
than exponentialt-ims attacks on elliptic curve based systems-.
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5 Conclusion
We have seen that the factoring and discrete logarithm problems are re rkablysimilar: both are
easy to foimulate be] e’ eo -o be hard purely based on our Jack ofsuccess so ving them effieeritlv, suitable
for tue des 1k of public key crvptosystems arid most rexcsikably, -hey seem to be susceptible to er
smular SolUtiOn ntethods The last point is quite worricome: even though not all factoring methods c*n be
turned into discrete logarithm metbcds ‘ecm is the most notable excepulori). most can.. Thus. it is
conceivable tha; a newly invented factoth g method that wipes out all factoring based cy-ptosystems
wouid have the same effect on discrete icgarithm based tos’ems Obviously, there is a strong need
for diversiftcatic’n in the design of public key cryptesystems.
These iues, though cruca: for the design of secuxe networks7are actually the least of our curren:
worries. It is riot unlikely that instead ofenjoying the fruits of our number theoretic nojnrpetexicewe will
soon be harvesting the rotten fruits of our incompetence at properly implementing or use the much
needed security measures. As soon i.s we leave the realm of mathematics, security considerations become
much macre confosed arjd complicated: hu:naii factors, compatibility issues trust management, key
management, key escrow, export restrictions, to mention only a few. are crucial issues that have an
enormous potential to be exploited by a worldwide army of hookers that cannot necessarily distinguish a
prime from a composite. This is not to say that security on the net cannot be er±ieved, but the subject
requires study of much mote than the rriatbernatical isues alone
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